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Abstract
We develop a tractable two-sector endogenous growth model in which het-
erogeneous entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints and the government col-
lects tax to fund public eduction for human capital accumulation. This model
is isomorphic to a Uzawa-Lucas model so exhibits a balanced-growth path
equilibrium but the growth rate depends on the level of financial deepening.
We then show that the policy tax rate exerts inverted U-shaped effects on the
balanced growth path rate. Moreover, at the optimal policy tax rates this
model’s analytical implications are consistent with correlations between finan-
cial deepening and factor accumulation and working hours documented from
35 OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the effects of financial deepening on factor accumulation and
growth dynamics in an economy with firm heterogeneity and financial imperfec-
tion. It is motivated by regularities documented from all 35 OECD countries using
macroeconomic data from the Penn World Table 9.0 (PWT 9.0), updated Financial
Development and Structure Data-set, and Barro-Lee Education Attainment Data-
set. 1 In particular, there are significant differences in the level of financial deepening
among 35 OECD countries; the Private Credit indicator that reflects financial deep-
ening,2 ranges from 18% in Mexico to 187% in the USA. Among OECD countries,
those economies with deeper financial markets tend to:
(i) Have both higher levels of physical capital stock per person employed and
higher average level of human capital.
(ii) Have higher levels of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and use physical capi-
tal more intensively with respect to human capital, namely have higher ratio
of physical capital stock per person employed over the corresponding human
capital level.
(iii) Have less average annual hour worked but spend more time on education at-
tainment activities. 3
To explain these aforementioned regularities, this paper develops a tractable two-
sector endogenous growth model in which heterogeneous entrepreneurs face borrow-
ing constraints and the government collects tax to fund public eduction for human
capital accumulation. It focuses on the interaction between firm productivity het-
erogeneity and the efficiency of the financial markets in allocating capital. To be
1See Appendix A for the description of these Data-sets.
2Private Credit is defined as the ratio of total credit issued by depository and other financial
institutions to the private sector over GDP. Private Credit and Liquid Liabilities (M3) over GDP
are the two most used measures of financial deepening in the literature. A similar figure using
Liquid Liabilities is available upon request.
3The average years of total schooling for the age group beyond 15 can be considered as a proxy
for both the level of human capital and the average time spent on investing in education.
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more specific, when financial imperfections exists, all entrepreneurs including those
with the highest productivity face borrowing constraints. Hence, highly productive
entrepreneurs are unable to borrow capital to a desired level to extend production
while less productive ones participate in producing goods. Consequently, capital is
not efficiently allocated and the aggregated productivity is not optimal. 4 As the
financial markets deepen, the borrowing constraint is gradually relaxed and more
capital is allocated to more productive producers. As a result, the productivity cut-
off, the threshold of entrepreneurs who are active in producing goods, and aggregate
productivity of the economy increase along with financial depth.
Productivity improvement in turn influences the dynamics of input factors and
the aggregates of the economy. An increase in the aggregate productivity increases
the capital returns, hence facilitating the accumulation of physical capital and raising
the government’s capital tax revenues. Productivity also increases the wage rates so
encourages workers to spend more time on the education activities, which leads to
faster human capital accumulation. As a result, a higher level of financial deepening
leads to a higher aggregate productivity, more time spent on education, and a faster
growth rate. Moreover, it is shown in this paper that if the government chooses the
optimal policy tax rates that maximizes the balanced-growth path rates, the govern-
ment should impose a higher tax rate in economies with deeper financial markets.
In general, a higher policy rate rate dampens the accumulation of physical capital
but leads to higher government expenditure on education, hence faster accumulation
of human capital. However, it turns out that the growth effects on physical capital
accumulation, the effects that arises from aggregate productivity improvements, still
dominates the taxation effects, therefore, relative physical capital intensity becomes
higher in economies with deeper financial markets.
Related Literature: This paper first belongs to the large literature that studies
4When there are no borrowing constraint, because of productivity heterogeneity, only en-
trepreneurs with the highest productivity produce goods, while all others just save and lend capital.
Hence, capital is efficiently allocated to the most productive entrepreneurs and aggregate measured
productivity is optimal.
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the relationships between financial market frictions and economic development.5 It
is closely related to the branch of literature that focuses on the interaction between
entrepreneurship, financial frictions, and productivity . Specifically, the efficiency of
financial markets, by influencing firms’ decisions on factor accumulation, affects the
determination of aggregates and growth dynamics. 6 It contributes to this branch of
literature by examining the impacts of financial deepening in a tractable two-sector
endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation.
This paper is closely related to and develops from the theoretical framework of
Moll (2014), who explores the role of self-financing in a general equilibrium environ-
ment with heterogeneous productivity and financial imperfections. Specifically, Moll
(2014) introduces productivity persistence into the previous work of Angeletos (2007)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), and shows that entrepreneurs can possibly accu-
mulate enough internal funds to overcome borrowing constraints when the shocks
are sufficiently persistent. Hence, self-financing can undo capital mis-allocation and
reduce the long-run steady state TFP losses.
This paper extends the theoretical model of Moll (2014) by incorporating the
accumulation of human capital, hence, addressing the effects of financial deepening
in a two-sector endogenous model, which is isomorphic to a Uzawa-Lucas model. 7
In this paper, human capital is accumulated by the worker’s efforts, the existing level
of human capital stock and also public eduction provided by the government who
collects taxes. By incorporating the accumulation of human capital and taxation,
this paper is able to address the effects of financial deepening on the accumulation
of both physical and human capital and working hours. It can also analyze the
effects of taxation on the aggregate dynamics. This paper contributes to the two-
sector endogenous growth literature by showing that in the presence of financial
imperfections and firm heterogeneity, capital taxation exerts U-shaped effects on the
balanced growth path rate and that optimal policy rates and balanced-growth path
5See, e.g, Levine 2005 and Banerjee and Duflo, 2005 for a detailed survey.
6See Buera et al. (2015) for a thorough review of this literature.
7By contrast, the model in Moll (2014) a one-sector model and is isomorphic to the Solow model.
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rates are increasing functions of the level of financial deepening. 8
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model economy. Section
3 first defines and analyzes the aggregate equilibrium and the balanced-growth path
equilibrium; it then discusses the effects of government’s policy tax rate and shows
that the model’s implications are consistent with data. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This is a two-sector growth model. In particular, there is a representative worker
and a unit measure of entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur owns a private firm and are
indexed by their productivity, z, and their taxable personal wealth, a. Productivity
heterogeneous firms combines effective labor and physical capital to produce ho-
mogenous final goods used for both consumption and physical capital accumulation.
Human capital is accumulated by the representative worker’s efforts, the existing
level of human capital stock and also public eduction provided by the government.
The final goods sector is developed from Moll (2014) with efficiency labor.
2.1 The Representative Worker
The representative workers has the following preferences,∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log cw(t)dt (2.1)
where ρ is the discount rate and cw is the worker’s consumption.
At time t, this worker is endowed with one unit of non-leisure time and has
accumulated the level h(t) of human capital. He then chooses a fraction u(t) of his
time to supply u(t)h(t) efficiency units of labor at a competitive labor market at a
wage w(t). The worker uses the left fraction of his time 1 − u(t) to accumulate his
level of human capital via as the following function:
h˙ = b(1− u)hφg1−φe (2.2)
8See for example Mino (2015) for the discussion of AK endogenous growth model with produc-
tivity heterogeneity.
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where φ ∈ [0, 1], b is a parameter that denotes the efficiency of accumulating human
capital and ge is the level of government expenditures on public education that the
worker takes as given.
There are two main features that distinguishes human capital accumulation in
(2.2) from the literature. One is φ ≤ 1, which implies tha the production of human
capital exhibits diminishing returns to existing level of human capital stock, h(t).
This differs from the traditional Uzawa-Lucas model setting with φ = 1. The other
one is that the accumulation of human capital depends not only on private investment
input, 1 − u(t) and h(t) but also on the level of public investment/expenditure on
education, ge(t).
As in Moll (2014), we assume that the worker does not have access to financial
markets and consume all their labor incomes. Hence, his budget constraint is as
follows:9
cw(t) = u(t)h(t)w(t) (2.3)
The worker optimizes the sum of discounted utilities from consumption (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint (2.3) and his human capital accumulation (2.2)
while taking the wage rate w(t) and the amount of public spending on education
ge(t) as given. The optimization conditions imply that optimal allocating time to
work, u(t), will obey the following differential equations:
u˙
u
− buhφ−1g1−φe + ρ = 0 (2.4)
2.2 Entrepreneurs
All entrepreneurs have the same preferences,
E0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρet log ce(t)dt (2.5)
where ce expresses entrepreneur’s consumption.
9An important implication of this assumption is that since workers do not participate in the
capital markets, their behavior is not directly affected by the the process of capital accumulation.
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Each entrepreneur owns a firm that produces homogenous final goods. At each
time, t, this firm employs nd efficiency units of labor from workers at the wage rate,
w(t) and rents kd units of physical capital from a competitive capital market at the
rental rate, r(t), to produce final goods with the following production technology,
y = f(z, k, n) = (zk)α(n)1−α (2.6)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and z denotes idiosyncratic productivity and can be interpreted
as individual entrepreneurial ability or efficiency level of capital. We assume that
idiosyncratic productivity z is i.i.d over time as well as across entrepreneurs with
the distribution function G(z).10
Each time, an entrepreneur receives profits from his private firm and capital
returns from his personal assets but pays wealth tax to the government. 11 Therefore,
an entrepreneur’s wealth a(t) evolves as follows:12
a˙ = pi(z, k, n) + ra− τa− ce (2.7)
where pi(z, k, n) ≡ f(z, k, n)−wn−rk, denotes his firm profit and τ is wealth tax rate
imposed by the government. The entrepreneur however faces the following borrowing
constraint:
k
a
≤ λ (2.8)
where λ ≥ 1 denotes the maximum borrowing leverage ratio that reflects the degree
of financial deepening.
The borrowing constraint, (2.8), equivalently to k ≤ λa, states that the maximum
amount of capital an individual entrepreneur can borrow is limited by the amount
of his personal assets, a, and the efficiency of the financial markets characterized by
the maximum borrowing leverage ratio λ. In particular, λ = 1 expresses financial
10The law of large numbers then implies that the population share of type z entrepreneurs is
stationary and deterministic.
11As it will be shown later, entrepreneur consumption is also linear in his wealth so the imposition
of consumption tax on on entrepreneurs will lead to similar quantitative results.
12It is straightforward to show that rental capital market setting is equivalent to a setup where
entrepreneurs own and accumulate capital and are allowed to trade a risk-free bond.
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autarky where entrepreneurs are completely capital self-financed whereas λ = ∞
denotes perfect financial markets where entrepreneurs can borrow freely.13
Each entrepreneur maximizes the profit of his private firm subject to the tech-
nology (2.6) and his borrowing constraint (2.8) as,
Π(a, z) = max
k,n
{f(z, k, n)− wn− rk}
s.t. k ≤ λa
The optimization conditions of this problem state that individual entrepreneurs’
capital and effective labor demands and profits are linear in personal wealth, and
there is a productivity cutoff for active entrepreneurs z as follows:
kd(a, z) =
{
λa for z ≥ z
0 for z < z
(2.9)
nd(a, z) =
(
1− α
w
) 1
α
zλa (2.10)
Π(a, z) = max {zpi − r, 0}λa (2.11)
zpi = r (2.12)
pi ≡ α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
(2.13)
Entrepreneurs also maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities from con-
sumption (2.5) subject to the budget constraint (2.7), which can now be rewritten
as:
a˙ = [λmax {zpi − r, 0}+ r − τ ] a− ce (2.14)
Let V (a, z, t) be the value function of this optimality problem, then the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation is set as follows,
ρV (a, z, t) = max
ce(t)
{
log(ce(t)) +
1
dt
Ea,z [dV (a, z, t)] s.t. (2.14)
}
13Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014) for further discussions of this borrowing constraint.
7
This in turn implies the optimal consumption rule, c(t) = ρa(t).14 Consequently, we
obtain the following optimal saving policy function, which is linear in wealth.
a˙ = s(z)a, where : (2.15)
s(z) = λmax {zpi − r, 0}+ r − τ − ρe
is the optimal saving rate of productivity type z.
2.3 The Government
For simplicity, we assume that each time the government collects wealth tax from
all asset holders (the entrepreneurs) at a policy tax rate η and spends on public
education for the representative worker. The budget constraint of the government
then states: ∫
τadΦt(a, z) = ge (2.16)
where Φt(a, z) is the joint distribution of productivity and wealth at time t.
3 The Aggregate Equilibrium Dynamics
An equilibrium in this economy is consequences of factor prices {r(t), w(t)} and
corresponding quantities such that for a given tax policy η (i) each worker and
entrepreneur maximize their expected sum of discounted utilities subject to their
corresponding budget constraint taking as given equilibrium prices and (ii) the gov-
ernment budget constraint (2.16) balances and the factor markets clear at each point
in time ∫
kdt (a, z, Y )dΦt(a, z) =
∫
adΦt(a, z) ≡ k(t) (3.17)∫
ndt (a, z, Y )dΦt(a, z) = uh (3.18)
14This optimal rule can be confirmed as follows. First guess that the value function takes the
form V (a, z, t) = B [v(z, t) + loga], where B is an undermined constant. Substitute this form back
to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (2.15) and take first order condition to obtain c = a/B.
Substitute back in and then apply the envelop theorem to obtain B = 1/ρ.
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3.1 The Aggregate Equilibrium
The aggregate equilibrium dynamics of the model economy can be summarized up
in the following Proposition. 15
Proposition 1. For a given policy tax rate η, the aggregates per worker, the fraction
of non-leisure time assigned to goods production can be expressed as:
y = Akα(uh)1−α (3.19)
k˙ = αAkα(uh)1−α − (ρ+ τ)k (3.20)
h˙ = b(1− u)τ 1−φhφk1−φ (3.21)
u˙
u
− buτ 1−φhφ−1k1−φ + ρ = 0 (3.22)
where the measured aggregate productivity level, the productivity cutoff, and the ef-
fective tax rate are determined by
A(t) ≡ Eω,t [z|z ≥ z]α =
(
λ
∫ ∞
z
zg(z)dz
)α
(3.23)
1 = λ (1−G(z)) (3.24)
Finally, the wage rates and the capital return are given by,
w = (1− α)Akα(uh)−α (3.25)
r = α
z
Eω,t [z|z ≥ z]Ak
α−1(uh)1−α (3.26)
The relationship between financial deepening and the aggregate measure pro-
ductivity can be explained by using (3.23). Suppose that there is no borrowing
constraint. Then, because a firm’s profit is linear in capital as in (2.11), only en-
trepreneurs with the highest productivity, zmax, produce. Therefore, it is straight-
forward from (2.6) that the aggregate production function becomes,
Y = A¯kα(uh)1−α (3.27)
where A¯ = (zmax)
α is measured productivity in the absence of borrowing constraint.
15See the Appendix for the detailed derivation.
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As Eω,t [z|z ≥ z] ≤ zmax, A(t) ≤ A¯. Hence, there are TFP losses in the presence
of financial frictions and the magnitude of the losses is smaller when the productivity
cutoff, z, is higher. The equation (3.24) implies that as the financial markets deepen;
namely λ increases, only producers with relatively high productivity remain active
in producing goods and the aggregate measured productivity improves.
By contrast, when the financial markets are completely shutdown and all en-
trepreneurs are self-financed by their personal wealth, i.e., λ = 1, the measured
productivity is at its lower bound, A. To see this, first substitute λ = 1 into the
equation (3.24) we obtain that the productivity cutoff z is at its lower bound, 0.
This implies that all entrepreneurs including those are least productive participate
in productions by using their own personal funds and hence, the lower bound for the
measured productivity is equal to the average productivity of all entrepreneurs as,
A =
(∫ ∞
0
zg(z)dz
)α
(3.28)
For further analytical exploration, we make another assumption about the id-
iosyncratic productivity z. Specifically, each moment entrepreneurs draw z from a
Pareto distribution whose distribution function is given by,
G(z) =
{
1− (1
z
)ϕ
z ≥ 1
0 z < 1
(3.29)
where ϕ > 1 is the shape parameter. Smaller ϕ corresponds to a heavier tail of
the productivity distribution, i.e., a higher fraction of very productive entrepreneurs,
therefore, implying a higher degree of productivity heterogeneity among entrepreneurs.
The productivity density function g(z) for z ≥ 1 is hence ϕz−ϕ−1. Consequently,
weighted average of productivity of active entrepreneurs Eω,t [z|z ≥ z] = ϕϕ−1z and
the measured productivity can be expressed as follows:
A(t) ≡ Eω,t [z|z ≥ z]α =
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1z
)α
(3.30)
The capital market clearing equation (3.24) then implies the productivity cutoff z is
λ
1
ϕ and the measured TFP becomes,
A =
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
λ
α
ϕ (3.31)
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It is straightforward that measured productivity A increases with higher λ that
reflects deeper financial markets.
3.2 The Balanced-Growth Path Equilibrium
Define the relative physical capital intensity κ = k
h
as the ratio of physical capital
stock (per worker) over the average level of human capital and a balanced-growth
path equilibrium of this economy is established when,
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
=
h˙
h
= γ, for all t (3.32)
where γ denotes the balanced-growth rate. Under a balanced-growth path equilib-
rium, u and κ stay constant over time.
Substituting κ and γ into (3.20), (3.21), (3.22) and note at at a balanced-growth
path, u and κ, stay constant, we obtain the following 3 equations for 3 variables, κ,
γ and u as,
α
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
λ
α
ϕ
(κ
u
)α−1
− (ρ+ τ) = γ
b(1− u)τ 1−φκ1−φ = γ
− buτ 1−φκ1−φ + ρ = 0
Consequently, the balanced-growth equilibrium fraction of working hour, u and
physical-human capital ratio κ are given by:
u =
ρ
γ + ρ
(3.33)
κ =
1
τ
(
γ + ρ
b
) 1
1−φ
(3.34)
where the balanced-growth rate γ are determined by the following equation,
(γ + ρ+ τ) (γ + ρ)χ(2−φ) = αρ1−αbχτ 1−α
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
λ
α
ϕ (3.35)
where χ ≡ 1−α
1−φ
11
Proposition 2. When the following condition
ρα+χ
αα+1(1− α)1−α ≤
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ (3.36)
is satisfied then there exists a policy tax rate so that the economy follows a positive
balanced-growth path rate γ where deeper financial markets, i.e., higher λ, leads to
higher growth rates.
Intuitively, this Proposition states that economies with sufficiently financial deep-
ening, i.e., sufficiently high λ, and/or sufficiently efficient human capital sector, i.e.,
high b so that the condition (3.36) is satisfied then there can exist a balanced-growth
path rate.
Proof. Step 1 : We first show that if (3.36) is satisfied then there exists τ so that the
following condition is satisfied.
ρ+ τ
τ 1−α
< αρ−χ
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ (3.37)
Denote the LHS of (3.37) as m(τ), it is straightforward that m(τ) is an U-shaped
function of τ for τ > 0 and is minimized at τ˜ = 1−α
α
ρ and m(τ˜) = ρ
α
αα(1−α)1−α . Rewrite
the condition (3.36) as,
ρα
αα(1− α)1−α ≤ αρ
−χ
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ
which implies that the horizontal line that represents the RHS of (3.37) interacts the
vertical axis at a point higher than m(τ˜). Therefore, if τ belongs to (τ , τ¯), where
τ , τ¯ are two solutions of the following equation
ρ+ τ
τ 1−α
= αρ−χ
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ (3.38)
then the condition (3.37) is satisfied.
Step 2: If τ ∈ (τ , τ¯) so that (3.37) is satisfied then there exists a positive solution
for (3.35). Denote the LHS of (3.35) as Ψ(γ), then
Ψ(γ) ≥ 0, dΨ(γ)
dγ
> 0 for all γ ≥ −ρ
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i.e., the curve that represents the LHS of (3.35), Ψ(γ) is non-negative and strictly
increasing for all γ ≥ −ρ. Because the RHS of (3.35) is also a non-negative number,
(3.35) always has at least one solution. Rewrite (3.37) as,
(ρ+ τ) ρχ(2−φ) < αρ1−ατ 1−α
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ
which equivalently states that the horizontal line that represents the RHS of (3.35)
interacts the vertical axis at a point above Ψ(0). Consequently, there exists a unique
non-negative solution 0 ≤ γ for the equation (3.35).
The proof that under the balanced-growth path, a higher λ leads to a higher
growth rate and a lower fraction of working hours is straightforward from the two
equations that determine γ and u, (3.33) and (3.35)
Proposition 2 also implies that when the condition (3.36) is satisfied then the
policy tax rate τ should not be too low, namely not lower than τ and also not be
too high, namely not higher than τ¯ so that the economy converges to a balanced-
growth path. Intuitively, a very high policy rate rate (on entrepreneurs) will dampen
the accumulation of physical capital whereas a very low tax rate will lead to low
government expenditure on education, hence slow accumulation of human capital.
Moreover, (3.34) implies that on the balanced growth path, relative physical
capital intensity depends not only on the growth rate γ but also on the policy tax
rate τ . A higher level of financial deepening increases the growth rate, hence raising
the relative physical capital intensity while a higher physical capital tax rate reduces
the intensity. Therefore, we need to understand the effects of policy tax rate on the
aggregate dynamics and specify how the government choose the policy tax rate for
further analysis.
3.3 Taxation
We have assumed that the government passively chooses the policy tax rate, in this
sub-section we are going to address the effects of this policy rate on the growth rate
when the economy is on a balanced-growth path, i.e., τ ∈ (τ , τ¯).
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Proposition 3. When the economy is on its balanced-growth path, the policy tax
rate exerts inverted U-shaped effects on the growth rate.
Proof. Denote γ(τ) as the solution of (3.35). After substituting γ(τ) back into the
equation, differentiating with respect to τ we obtain,
dγ(τ)
dτ
= µ(τ) [γ(τ)− ν(τ)] (3.39)
where
µ(τ) ≡1− α
τ
[
1 + χ(2− φ)
(
γ(τ) + ρ+ τ
γ(τ) + ρ
)]−1
(3.40)
ν(τ) ≡ α
1− ατ − ρ (3.41)
Note that because γ(τ), µ(τ), and ν(τ) are continuous functions of τ for all τ ∈
(τ , τ¯), dγ(τ)
dτ
is a continuous function of τ . Moreover, since µ(τ) > 0 for all τ ∈
(τ , τ¯), the function’s sign of the slope (derivative) of γ(τ), namely dγ(τ)
dτ
, depends on
the magnitude relation between γ(τ) and ν(τ). In particular, γ(τ) is an increasing
function of τ when the curve representing γ(τ) is above the positive sloping line
representing ν(τ). When the curve representing γ(τ) is below that of ν(τ), γ(τ) is a
decreasing function of τ .
Also notice that dν(τ)
dτ
= α
1−α > 0 so ν(τ) is a strictly increasing function of τ .
Therefore, the two curves can not intersect tangentially. If the two curves intersect,
they must pass through each other because at any possible intersection point the slope
of γ(τ) must be equal to zero by definition while the slope of the line representing
ν(τ) is always positive. In addition, if there exists an intersection point then on the
left (right) of point, the curve representing γ(τ) must lie above (below) that of ν(τ)
hence γ(τ) must be increasing (decreasing) with τ . As a result, the two curves can
possibly intersect at most one point.
Recall from the definition of τ˜ , τ , τ¯ in (3.38) that,
γ(τ) =γ(τ¯) = 0
τ < τ˜ ≡1− α
α
ρ < τ¯
(3.42)
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hence,
dγ(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
> 0,
dγ(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
< 0 (3.43)
which equivalently states that at τ = τ(τ¯), the curve representing γ(τ) positions
above (below) the positive sloped line representing ν(τ).
(3.43) implies that there exists τ ∗ ∈ (τ , τ¯) such that
dγ(τ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ∗
= 0 or γ(τ ∗) = ν(τ ∗) =
α
1− ατ
∗ − ρ (3.44)
or equivalently the curve representing γ(τ) intersects the positive sloped line repre-
senting ν(τ) at τ ∗. As argued above, the two curves can only intersect at most one
point, therefore,
dγ(τ)
dτ
> 0 for τ ∈ (τ , τ ∗) , dγ(τ)
dτ
< 0 for τ ∈ (τ ∗, τ¯) (3.45)
Corollary 1. At the optimal policy tax rate, τ ∗ that maximizes the balanced-growth
path rate, relative physical capital intensity is an increasing function of the level of
financial deepening.
Proof. Substituting the equation (3.44) back into (3.35) to obtain the following equa-
tion that determines the optimal policy tax rate, τ ∗
τα
(
α
1− ατ
)χ(2−φ)
= α(1− α)ρ1−α
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ (3.46)
τ 1+χ = αα−χ(1− α)2−α+χρ1−α
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
bχλ
α
ϕ (3.47)
τ ∗ = θλ
α
ϕ(1+χ) (3.48)
where θ ≡
[
αα−χ(1− α)2−α+χρ1−αbχ
(
ϕ
ϕ−1
)α] 11+χ
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The optimal balanced growth path rate and its corresponding physical-human
capital ratio are then as follows,
γ∗ =
α
1− αθλ
α
ϕ(1+χ) − ρ (3.49)
κ∗ =
1
τ
(
γ + ρ
b
) 1
1−φ
=
[
α
b(1− α)θ
φ
] 1
1−φ
A
φ
(1−φ)(1+χ) =
[
α
b(1− α)θ
φ
] 1
1−φ
λ
αφ
ϕ(2−α−φ)
(3.50)
It is straightforward that τ ∗, γ∗, and κ∗ are an increasing function of parameter λ
that reflects financial deepening level.
The results of this corollary imply that when the government chooses the policy
tax rate that maximizes the balanced-growth path rate then relative physical cap-
ital intensity increases while the working hours decrease in economies with deeper
financial markets, which is consistent with regularities documented from 35 OECD
countries.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper starts by documenting several regularities regularities documented from
all 35 OECD countries, in particular the fact that economies with deeper financial
markets tend to have higher physical-human capital ratios but less average working
hours. To understand these regularities, the paper develops a tractable two-sector
endogenous growth model in which heterogeneous entrepreneurs face borrowing con-
straints and the government collects tax to fund public eduction for human capi-
tal accumulation. It then shows that this model is isomorphic to a Uzawa-Lucas
model so exhibits a balanced-growth path equilibrium but the growth rate depends
on the level of financial deepening. Moreover, when the model economy follows a
balanced-growth path equilibrium and the government chooses the policy tax rates
that maximize growth rates, this model’s analytical implications are consistent with
the documented regularities from OECD countries.
16
Appendix A: Data-set Description
(i) The Penn World Table 9.0 (PWT 9.0): Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and
Marcel P. Timmer (2015), “The Next Generation of the Penn World Table”
American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150-3182, available for download at
www.ggdc.net/pwt
(ii) Financial Development and Structure Data-set (Updated Nov. 2013): Thorsten
Beck , Asli Demirguc-Kunt , Ross Eric Levine , Martin Cihak and Erik H.B.
Feyen, available for download at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/
Resources/469232-1107449512766/FinStructure_November_2013.xlsx
(iii) Barro-Lee Education Attainment Data-set: Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee,
2013, “A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010.”
Journal of Development Economics, vol 104, pp.184-198, available for download
at http://www.barrolee.com/
Appendix B: Workers and Firms’ Optimization
The Representative Worker : The representative worker optimizes the following sum
of discounted utilities from consumption∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log cw(t)dt
subject to
h˙ = b(1− u)hφg1−φe
cw(t) = u(t)h(t)w(t)
After substituting the budget constraint into the instantaneous utility function
and denoting the current-value costate variable by µ(t), the current-value Hamilto-
nian for the representative worker’ optimization problem can be expressed as:
H (u, h, λ) = log [wuh] + µ
[
b(1− u)hφg1−φe
]
17
The F.O.Cs of this optimization state:
1
u
= µbhφg1−φe
1
h
+ µ
(
φb(1− u)hφ−1g1−φe
)
= ρµ− µ˙
lim
t→∞
e−ρtµ(t)h(t) = 0
These F.O.Cs together with the evolution equation for h imply that optimal
allocating time to work, u(t), will obey the following differential equations:
u˙
u
− buhφ−1g1−φe + ρ = 0
Firms’ Problem: Each entrepreneur maximizes the profit of his private firm sub-
ject to the technology (2.6) and his borrowing constraint (2.8), hence the profit of
an entrepreneur can be expressed as follows:
Π(a, z) = max
k,n
{f(z, k, n)− wn− rk}
s.t. k ≤ λa
The first order condition of this problem with respect to labor states:
(1− α)(zk)αn−α = w
The implied labor demand then is, nd =
(
1−α
w
) 1
α (zk). After substituting the opti-
mal labor demand into the technology equation (2.6) we then obtain the production
function that is linear in individual entrepreneurs capital input as follows:
F (z, k) =
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
(zk)
Consequently, an entrepreneur’s profits can be expressed as:
Π(a, z) = max
k
{
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
zk − rk
}
s.t. k ≤ λa
This entrepreneur’s profit is linear in capital input, hence implying capital demand,
labor demand and the productivity cutoff as in (2.9).
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Appendix B: Proof of the Proposition 1
In this economy, the aggregate output denoted by y can be obtained by summing
the amounts of homogenous final goods produced by all active entrepreneurs, i.e.,
entrepreneurs with idiosyncratic productivity higher than the cut-off z:
y =
∫
f(z, k, l)dΦt(a, z) =
∫∫ (
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
zλag(z)ψ(a)dadz
=
pi
α
λ
∫
zg(z)dz
∫
aψ(a)da =
pi
α
λK
∫ ∞
z
zω(z, t)dz
=
pi
α
λXk, where X ≡
∫ ∞
z
zg(z)dz
(4.51)
Substituting the optimal labor demand (2.10) into the labor market clearing
condition (3.18), we obtain
uh =
∫
nd(a, z)dΦ(a, z) =
(pi
α
) 1
1−α
λXk
which then implies that:
pi = α (λX)α−1 kα−1(uh)1−α (4.52)
Plugging this equation back to (4.51) we obtain the aggregate output as follows:
y = (λX)α u1−αk[1+α−1](h)1−α = Akα(uh)1−α
where A is the endogenous measured TFP
A(t) ≡ (λX)α =
(∫∞
z
zg(z)dz
(1−G(z))
)α
= Eω [z|z ≥ z]α
The wage rate, w, can be obtained by substituting (4.52) into the definition of pi
(2.13):
w = (1− α)Akα(uh)−α
Similarly, the capital return, r, can be expressed as:
r = α
z
Eω,t [z|z ≥ z]Ak
α−1(uh)1−α
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The budget constraint of the government becomes
ge =
∫
τadΦt(a, z) =
∫∫
τag(z)ψ(a)dadz = kτ
We then derive the dynamic equation of the aggregate capital stock, k, by first
aggregating wealth of all entrepreneurs
k˙
k
=
1
k
∫
a˙dΦ(a, z) =
1
k
∫∫
a˙g(z)ψ(a)dadz
=
1
k
∫∫
(λmax {zpi − r, 0}+ r − η − ρ) ag(z)ψ(a)dadz
=
∫ ∞
0
(λmax {zpi − r, 0}+ r − η − ρ) g(z)dz
and then dividing entrepreneurs into the inactive group (z < z) and the active group
(z ≥ z), therefore
k˙
k
= r − ρ− τ +
∫ ∞
z
λ {zpi − r} g(z)dz = r − ρ− τ + piλ
∫ ∞
z
zg(z)dz − rλ
∫ ∞
z
g(z)dz
=piλX + r − ρ− τ − r = α (λX)α−1 kα−1λX − ρ = αAkα−1(uh)1−α − ρ− τ
where the third and forth equal signs are implied by the definition of X in (3.19), z
in (2.12), and pi in (4.52).
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